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DEFINITIONS EXPLANATORY OF THE POSITION OF
"THE OPEN COURT."
The Data of experience are perceptions.
Reality is the sum total of all that is.
Truth is the conformity of cognition to reality.
[Truth being a relation between subject and object appears to
be relative in its nature. Absolute truth is a self-contradiction; it
would imply cognition without a cognizing subject.
At the same time it is obvious that absolute existence (in fact
everything absolute) is impossible. Reality is properly called IVirk-
lichkeit in German, derived from wirken, to take effect. Reality is
not immovable and unchangeable absoluteness, but the effective-
ness of things in their relations. Reality therefore implies not
only existence, but the manifestation of existence also. Existence
and its manifestation are not two different things ; both are one.
The idea of something absolutely Unknowable is therefore also
untenable ; it would imply the existence of an object whose ex-
istence is not manifested ;'. e., existence without reality; Sein
ohne Wirklichkeit—which is a contradiction, an impossibility. ]
Science is the search for truth.
The nature of science is the economy of thought. (Mack.)
Economy of thought is possible through application of the
laws of form to thought.
Knowledge is the possession of certain truths.
[Knowledge is, so to say, the present stock or capital with
which Science works. Science cannot exist without knowledge.
The object of Science is not only to increase and enlarge knowl-
edge but also to purify the present stock of knowledge from vague-
ness, errors, and misconceptions.
The purpose of knowledge is that of increasing our power over
nature.]
Monism is that philosophy which recognizes the oneness of All-
existence, and the Religion of Monism teaches that the individual,
as a Dart of the whole, has to conform to the cosmical laws of the
All.
Religion is man's aspiration to be in harmony with the All.
[Religion has been defined differently in the columns of Thb
OpeiV Couvt, but all definitions that have been presented are in
strict agreement. Mr. Hegeler in No. 25, defines Religion as
"man's union with the All " (taking the definition from the Lu-
theran Catechism " Religion ist der Bund des Meuschen mit Gott
durchGott, " and replacing the Word God by the more compre-
hensive word The All). The editor has defined Religion as
" man's consciousness of his relation to the All" (No. 24); as "Das
AUgefuhl im Einzelnen," the All-feeling in the individual (see
foot-note page 965); as " man's conception of the world that serves
him as a guiding-star through life" (page 1180).]
Morals are man's conduct in so far as it is in unison with the All.
[The basis of morality is religion. A moral educator or
preacher may justly be asked, " On what authority dost thou jus-
tify thy precepts?" And he will tell us that his authority is not
persoual; he speaks in the name of universal order. Accordingly
his authority is that of religion. Ifi t were not so, all his good
precepts would have no foundation; they would hover in the air
like beautiful dreams that have no reality.]
Ethics is the Science of Morals; it teaches man why he must,
and how he can, regulate his conduct so as to be in unison
with the All.
Natural history and the history of mankind prove that here on
earth a constant progress takes place developing ever higher forms
of existence.
Morally good are those acts which are in harmony with the All,
i. e.
,
those which enhance progress, and tnorally bad are those
which are not in harmony with the All, i. e.
,
those which retard or
prevent progress.
[Religion (man's aspiration to be in unison with the All) has
naturally produced many superstitious notions in the world, of its
origin, and of its purpose. Similarly, science (man's search for
truth) has produced many errors or false notions of reality. But
all the superstitions of religion do not prove that religion as such
is an illusion, and all the errors of science are no evidence that sci-
ence as such is a sham.
It is obvious that religion and science, as here defined, are not
contradictory to, but complementary of, each other. If religion
and science do not agree, it is a certain sign that our conception of
either the one or the other is wrong. The history of the human
mind has been one of constant conflict and reconciliation between
religion and science. Their relation has repeatedly been disturbed
and re-adjusted.
The unitary conception of the world affords the only basis for
the union of Religion and Science, and opens a new vista of pro-
gress for both.]
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THE HtTMAN SOUL.
The practical purpose of Religion is the salvation
of human souls. When Jesus was walking b)' the Sea
of Galilee, he saw t>vo brethren, Simon, called Peter,
and Andrew, his brother, casting a net into the sea :
for they were fishers. And he sayeth unto them : " Fol-
low me and I will make you fishers of men."
And so shall ministers be fishers of men to save
human souls. But how can they save human souls
when we are told that modern psychology is a psychol-
ogy without a soul ? The immortal soul, consisting
of a trancendent substance, as it was supposed to be
b\'the old schools of orthodox theology, does not exist.
There is no such a thing as an eternal and mystical
ego which continues to live even if the body dies.
The great Scotch philosopher, Hume, said :
" As for me, whenever I contemplate what is inmost in what I
call my own self, I always come in contact with such or such spe-
cial perception as of cold, heat, light or shadow, love or hate,
pleasure or pain. I never come unawares upon my mind existing
in a state void of perceptions ; I never observe aught save percep-
tion .... If any one, after serious reflection and without preju-
dices, thinks he has any other idea of himself, I confess that I can
reason no longer with him. The best I can say for him is that per-
haps he is right no less than I, and that on this point our natures
are essentially different. It is possible that he may perceive some-
thing simple and permanent which he calls himself, but as for me
I am quite sure I possess no such principle." *
Modern psychology has fully adopted Hume's posi-
tion. If a man speaks about himself, he means per-
haps his bod)', or a certain part of his body. In an-
other case he may mean a special idea of his mind. It
is that idea which at the time is prominent in his soul
and which he pronounces as his opinion. Formerly it
was supposed that the ego who pronounces the opinion,
•'I say this and I say that," was one thing, and the
opinion adopted by that ego another thing. And this
ego was supposed to form the basis of man's person-
ality, its supernatural unity. Modern ps}'chology now
contends that this ego is identical with its opinion ;
the " I say" is identical with the idea pronounced ; or,
in other words, the ego and its contents are one.
Accordingly, our ego is constantly changing, for it is
now this, now that idea, which is prominent in our
mind. An ego by itself, a thinking subject without an
idea, a perception, or sensation to be thought or felt,
* Hume, Works, Vol. I. p. 321.
does not exist ; and our soul is nothing but the suin
total of all the ideas that live in our brain.
Very well then ! The ego, as a thing independent
of its contents, is a sham and always was a sham. Can
a man be afraid of losing that which he never pos-
sessed ? Certainly not I Renounce that ego, and aban-
don your anxiety about its preservation.
The matter, however, is different concerning the
preservation of your soul. Is the soul of man less valu-
able since it has been proved that it lacks the unity
which the ego was supposed to afford to it. Not in the
least ! Our soul, whatever it be, remains as valuable
and precious as ever ; if it is the sum total of our
thoughts merel}', yet that is the suin total of our intel-
lectual and moral existence. The ideas which in
their totality constitute ourselves, are the elements
that condition our actions, and our actions shape
our future ; they will lead us to higher planes, or they
will undo us and wreck our lives. Thus the purpose of
religion, to save the souls of man, it seems, becomes
rather more urgent than before.
Science seems to destroy Religion. But it does not ;
it destroys its errors only. Indeed, it becomes the
basis of Religion, and Religion based on Science will
be truer, purer, and grander. When our long cherished
errors fade away before the light of science, life appear?
so empty and truth seems void of comfort. Let us,
however, not be dismayed ! After all, truth is better
than error and a deeper insight always proves in the
end that the truths taught by science are by far nobler
and greater than the loftiest fiction and fairj'-tales of
our imagination can be.
Let us but consider how easily souls are lost ! The
purpose of religion becomes more imperative when we
bear in mind the fact that souls can grow and expand.
We can implant in the souls of men new thoughts
and purer ideas, which will preserve them in tempta-
tions and guide them through the many allurements
and dangers of the world. We can by instruction and
example transmit to the minds of children our own
souls, and thus build again our characters in the grow-
ing generation.
Gcethe said: 'The son should be better than the
father'; and yet the son can- be better only if the
father rears the better part of himself in the soul of
, his son. Thus humanity will progress, it will advance
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more and more in the triumphant march of evolu-
tion.
The child that lies in the cradle possesses a most pre-
cious soul. But the infant's mind is a promise rather
than a real and full grown soul ; it is the bud not the
fruit; it is a dear hope, a potentiality, but not the harvest
of maturity. The most valuable parts of his soul, the
elements of manly strength and of moral character that
will give stability to his will and direction to his pur-
pose, must be implanted into the tender mind of the
child. All that which makes of man a human being,
must be grafted upon the inherited predisposition of
his mind. And how easily is that purity lost, how
quickly is that innocence gone which appears as the
sweetest charm in the beaming eyes of children. When
they come in contact with the lower tendencies of life,
how readily evil thoughts enter their minds and impure
ideas poison their souls and the habits of their lives.
Therefore David prayed, " Create in me a clean heart,
O God, and renew a right spirit within me."
The soul of man is not immortal in the sense that
matter and energy are now known to be indestruc-
tible. On the contrary, the soul of man is mortal. But
seeing that we can make it immortal, that we can pre-
serve our souls even after death in the coming genera-
tions, that we can implant our spirit in our children,
the purpose of religion grows in its scope and im-
portance.
The pure, the noble, the great, the moral thought
will live and will exercise upon everyone a wholesome
influence. If our soul is the sum total of our hopes
and wishes, of our aspirations and longings, of our con-
cepts and our ideas, let us take heed and beware not
to introduce evil thoughts, but let us receive into our
s(Kil the love of truth and the eagerness of performing
that which is right and just. This is the object of re-
ligion; and this is the sum total of the religion of man-
kind.
Bad thoughts as well as good thoughts are like
leaven ; and a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump.
Let the religion of humanity thus enter your souls not
as words without a meaning that slumber like a dead
letter in your mind, but as a power of enthusiasm
which, like the leaven in meal, pervades all your
thoughts and sentiments until the whole be leavened
and changed into another and better substance.
Morality is that which preserves our soul, and it is
the moral part of our soul only which we wish to pre-
serve in our children. Immorality is that which leads
to wreck and ruin, but morality makes life everlasting.
The immortality thus acquired is greatly different
from the old dogmatic view of immortalit}'. The old view
of immortality is a chimera of Utopian character, the
new view is a truth established by science, a truth that
can be verified. The old view of immortality is a holy
legend, and the best that can be said of it is this, that
it foreboded the true view of immortality which teaches
that there is a continuation of Our soul-life after death.
This continuation, however, is not an inherent quality
of the soul, nor is it given to us as an act of mercy.
The continuation of our soul-life must be acquired by
our own efforts, it must be worked for, it must be
earned by hard struggles, and it must be deserved.
I see all the world gathering earthly treasures to-
leave an inheritance to their children. But I see few
who care for their souls. All interests are taken up with
the desire for riches, but the most valuable riches which
you might possess, remain neglected. You provide for
meat and raiment and other necessities of life, but you
disregard to provide for the immortality of your soul.
What are all the possessions of man if he is not
wise enough to use them well, and what is power and
earthly blessings if the men -to whose lot they have
fallen, cease to progress or even comn^ence to degen-
erate ? What is an inheritance left to your children, be it
ever so great, if you disregard the education of their
souls? The word of Christ will forever remain a great
truth: "What shall it profit a man, if he shall gain
the whole world and lose his own soul?" (Mark
vin. 36.)
SOME AMERICAN THOUGHTS ON THE FRENCH
EXPOSITION.
BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.
The great Exhibition has come to an end, and my
admiration of it is accompanied by a shudder at the
thought of any such thing occurring in New York. I
do not merely consider the inevitable and permanent
congestion of our one lung there,—Central Park,—but
of the certain injury to regular trade. 'An exhibition
stimulates into feverish activity hotel business, news-
paper enterprise, and trade in trifles ; biit all regular
commerce suffers. So many souvenirs, trinkets, pretty
things, are bought, that little money is left for solid
things. I am informed also that every Exhibition in
Paris raises prices,—the tradesmen wish to make hay
while the sun shines,—but that the prices never recede
from their exaggerated level. I need not say how dis-
astrous this would be in New York, where prices are
already so inflated. If Chicago wants the Columbus-
Exhibition of 1892, I hope she will get it, but I speak
as a New Yorker, and with a consciousness of being
like the Salvationist girl who said that she found her
jewels were carrying her to the devil, and gave them
all to her sister.
After this preface, it may appear contradictory to
say that France has been benefitted by this Exhibi-
tion, but no doubt such is the fact. Paris is so nor-
mally the great mart of bagatelles, that the Exhibition,
though it inflate, does not demoralize its regular bus-
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iness. It is always the world's bazaar. Then it has in
its Champ de Mars a place at once apart and near, so
that its Elysian Fields are not injured. So much be-
ing secured, one may contemplate with satisfaction
the political advantage gained b}' the Republic in hav-
ing shown its ability to get up a more splendid E.xhibi-
tion than the Empire did in 1867. The French masses,
being grown up children, (perhaps little the worse for
that,) are made happy bj' this big show and have a
fair chance of forgetting the empire.
How well do I remember that brilliant day, over
twenty-two years ago, when Napoleon III. and his em-
press received the homage of European courts. It was
in a vestibule of the Exposition (1867), which they were
opening, and I remember that the emperor stood near
a statue which appeared to represent Mirth, until you
took a step or two—then the merry face was found to
be a mask held up before a face aged with pain.
When soon afterwards it was known that in that glit-
tering moment the emperor and empress knew they
were being drawn to the cataract over which they were
precipitated, I remembered that masked statue. The
next time I saw Louis Napoleon he was starting out
to Metz to fight Prussia ; and I saw him at the end of
that journej'—laid out in an English country- house
with candles burning around him. Whether the pres-
ent felicity of France is to have a like tragical termi-
nation will depend on her ability to outgrow the ven-
detta feeling towards Germany. It was the only pity
of the exhibition that Germany was conspicuously ab-
sent,—necessaril)', perhaps ; for whether Paris would
have been moved to wrath or amiability by her conquer-
er's presence, is a question too doubtful for the risk to
have been incurred. There are some hopeful signs of the
decline of the feeling of revenge. In a booth where
people trj' thfeir skill in aiming, at two cents a shot, the
objects shot at were toy Germans in the windows of a
" Citadel of Prussians." In a few of the provincial
theatres cruel "Prussians" and heroic Frenchmen ap-
pear on the stage. But this kind of thing seems to be
confined to the more illiterate populace. On the other
hand the election of Prof. Curtius, of Berlin, as corre-
sponding member of the French Institute indicates the
growth of a healthier sentiment among the intelligent.
It is true that the name of the historian Mommsen was
set aside at the same time because he was reported to
have advised the late emperor to conquer Alsace. He
has written a letter declaring the report untrue ; but
it is to be feared the masses here will for some time go
on believing it as firmly as they do that General Grant
telegraphed the Emperor of Germany congratulations
after his every victory.
The exhibition closed in a blaze of glory. In the
evening of that day, I looked from an elevation on a
city of many-colored flame, with twenty great fountains
playing, and domes of light ; and at the end the Eiffel
Tower turned to a Pillar of Fire. There was a roar of
artillery besieging for the last time the rebuilt Bastille.
The Tunisian dancers went through their last contor-
tions, the shout of a million voices was heard. The
pictorial prophecy of the Parliament of Man and Fed-
eration of the World was sealed. Floquet, eloquent
President of the Deputies, elicited bravos from the
newly-opened Assembly by declaring, "A lightning-
flash of the Fraternity of 1789 issuing from Paris has
passed over the world."
For the moment the sequel of the Exhibition is not
very fraternal among Americans in Paris. Our artists,
because only one of their number was decorated,—and
he a member of the jury, who decorated himself,—are
much humiliated. This juryman is accused by some
of wishing to enhance his distinction by taking care
that no other American artist should obtain the like.
Our publishers, too, have had some gall mingled with
their honors. When one was proposed for some honor
in his business, M. Ollendorf protested that the said
publisher had made much money out of his father's
linguistic school-books, but that no Ollendorf had ever
received a cent from America. This gentleman's pro-
test was overcome by the unsatisfactory method of re-
minding him that many foreign authors had similarly
suffered, and many American publishers offended, and
4;hat the honors might be given in gratitude for better
things hoped for in the future. It says much for French
amiability that every suggestion of honors to American
publishers and artists was not hooted, in view of our
outlawry in the matter of copyright, and our almott
prohibitory duties on foreign works of art.
The excessive ambition of Americans to wear the
little red badge of the Legion of Honor is significant
:
I attribute it chiefly to the absence of any adequate
recognition of art and literature in the United States.
A good many of our ablest youth have gradually ex-
patriated themselves in sentiment as well as in resi-
dence. I have conversed with some of them, and they
declare that they do not mean to return : they count
for nothing in America compared with a speculator ;
they do not get their money's worth there ; they find
life commonplace there ; they have gone back now and
then, but were always happy to return. The mischief
of all this is that, on the whole, it is true. It ought to
be considered by our people that their brains are being
largely exported to Europe by an uncivilized attitude
towards art and literature,—in the absence of inter-
national copyright,—while at the same time they are
importing " Europeanism " in thought by substituting
the unpaid labor of foreign brains for American work.
I was present in a literary company in Paris when this
subject was discussed, and was asked whether any
author in the United States was supporting himself by
2006 THE OPKN COURT.
independent literary work. I could hardly recall one.
Even our great men,—Emerson, Longfellow, Lowell,
Holmes,—have had to be lecturers or professors ; some
— like Bancroft, Hawthorne, Motley, Lowell—have
had to seek ofifice. And our brilliant writers—Howells,
Gilder, Arlo Bates, Julian Hawthorne, and many others
—have had to dispose of themselves to magazine and
newspaper publishers, and write their more real and
congenial works in the intervals of such popular work.
It looks as if presently there would be only magazine
literature in America. It is true that under these con-
ditions our American magazines are becoming the best
in the world ; and no one can regret that a great deal
of talent should go into them. But it would be dis-
creditable to the new world if it should prove unfavor-
able to the evolution of thinkers born to liberate the
popular mind rather than cater to it, or merely please
it. The two American heroes of the exhibition seem
to have been Edison and Buffalo Bill. No doubt they
are both, in a sense, representative men ; but, without
disparaging either, an American can hardly regard
them as filling his new-world horizon. One would
have been glad to see something from across the At-
lantic more striking in the way of fine art,—although
our gallerj' of pictures was generally good. In fact, it
would be good enough for a young nation, were one
certain that the tendencies were towards something
better,—and something American. But the American
gallery was a sort of second-class European exhibition.
I remembered that when George Washington was
offered a large donation from his state he declined it,
personally, and passed the gift on to found a University
in the District of Columbia. He said that it was im-
portant that American youths should not be compelled
to seek their culture abroad. The money remains un-
utilized. The University is not yet built. But the
Papacy has founded a University at Washington.
There is no "Monroe doctrine" to prevent the in-
vasion of America by European superstitions when
they are outgrown in the region of their origin.
I do not mean to suggest, by these reflections, that
humanity in the New World should break with its
past in the Old World. But surely it were better to
develop an American intellect capable of digesting
foreign literatures and arts, and converting them into
our own western tissues, rather than—as it were
—
plagiarizing them. Both our political constitution and
our religion are plagiarized from Europe. They are
anachronistic plagiarisms too : we give fresh repairs
and leases to institutions that in Europe are no more
inhabited than its mouldy castles. We need, not less,
but more of the new Europe which has grown since
Plymouth and Jamestown were founded, and since the
Revolution of Independence. But in order to convert
this new Europe into yVmerican fibre, we must manage
to keep our best American hearts, and finest American
brains, at home; to secure for them there a free and
full habitat. And this cannot be so long as our artists
are encouraged to mediocrity by artificial protection
against foreign competitors ; and while our literary
men are compelled to compete against foreign laborers
without wages.
-Paris, November.
ASPECTS OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.
PSYCHOLOGY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNI FED STATES.
BY JOSEPH lASTROW, PH.D.
It is difficult for several reasons to describe justly
and briefly the status of psychology in Great Britain.
The mere enumeration of the more prominent authors
and their works would hardly give much insight into
the underlying influences and interests to which these
works owe their origin. On the other hand in singling
out certain phases of activity as representative, there
is danger of slighting others, as well as of giving to
British psychology an appearance of harmony and
unity that it does not altogether possess. I shall
attempt a middle course between these tendencies.
Again, we must remember that the connection of pre-
sent teachings with the past has been kept very vital
in English philosophic thought, and that the special-
ization of psychology from the other mental sciences
has not been as marked as elsewhere. The associa-
tionist-school directly continue the present with the
former philosophical interests, and the traces of this
parentage are evident in those who have adopted new
methods and modern ideas. The names of Bain and
Sully at once suggest themselves ; both of whom have
contributed largely to the maintainance of a healthy
interest in mental science and have distinctly advanced
the status of psychology in their country. Two other
authors should be mentioned as eminently influential
in furthering the scientific view of the relations of body
and mind, as well as in disseminating in attractive
shape sound views of the minor forms of mental ab-
normalitj',—Carpenter and Maudsley. The former has
given us the most attractive exposition of the chief
phenomena of every-day mental life, as well as guided
into healthy channels the popular views regarding
hypnotism, thought-reading, and the borderland of
mental science ; while the latter in his ' ' Physiology and
Pathology of Mind " offers an equally forcible treatment
of allied problems. There should be mentioned, too,
as illustrating the same line of activity, the work of
Dr. Hack Tukeupon the " Influence of the Mind on the
Body." From a more distinctly pathological point of
view we may cite the papers of Dr. Hughlings Jackson,
and of Dr. Ireland (in his volume "The Blot upon the
Brain"). The psychology of Herbert Spencer is too
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well known to need more than a mention here. In-
dependently of any final verdict as to the merits of the
general system in which this psychology finds a place,
one must attribute to the influence of his works an
essential share in the present psychological interests,
as well as the general acceptance of facts and views
that have contributed to clear and rational modes of
thought. We could similarly pay tribute to other
English ps3'chologists, such as Croom Robertson and
Ward, Romanes and Grant Allen. But it will better
answer the present purpose to venture to trace the
underlying spirit and attitude that inspire and unify
these contributions, even though in so doing we run
the risk of giving undue unity to the position.
Accordingly I should select, as most representative
of British psychological activity, the study of compar-
ative psychology. That much of this activity is directly
due to the influence of Darwin can hardly be doubted.
The general deepening and widening of interests in
biological matters that the introduction of the evolu-
tionary hypothesis brought about, bore similar good
fruit in the world of mental facts. Darwin's own work
upon "The Expression of the Emotions in Men and
Animals," his essays on instinct, and his stud}' of the
mental development of his own child, together with
the numerous psychological observations with which
his works abound, furthered and directed this interest.
The detailed elaboration of the progressive scale of in-
telligences from protozoon to man has nowhere received
a more studious cultivation than in England. The
fullest and most systematic of such expositions is that
given by Dr. G. J. Romanes, an eminent personal dis-
ciple of Darwin. In the first of his three works " An-
imal Intelligence," he has arranged and interpreted an
abundant collection of instances illustrating the adap-
tation of means to ends at all stages of the animal
scale. Constantly utilizing this interesting and valuable
store-house of facts. Dr. Romanes proceeds in his
second volume, "Mental Evolution in Animals," to
trace the guiding principles that shall bring law and
order into this domain. A portion of the result finds
expression in a scheme indicating at what levels of
intelligence certain typical emotions and actions first
make their appearance, and such traits are further
utilized to illustrate the correlation of mental with
bodily function, both being regarded as resulting from
favorable variations in the struggle for existence. In
the completing work of the series, " Mental Evolution
in Man," the same derivative argument is applied to
the faculties of man, the especial object being to an-
alyze critically the specific bases of human superiority,
and to show that the step from the highest stages of
animal to the lowest stages of human development are
not steeper than nature presents elsewhere. In the
very painstaking and suggestive elaboration of this
argument. Dr. Romanes has expounded general prin-
ciples and proposed psychological distinctions of fac-
ulty, both human and animal, that have a high value
independently of their place in his system. However
little we may agree with the complete system of Ro-
manes, and admitting that he classifies the facts of
animal intelligence rather more systematically than
nature offers them, we must recognize in his work a
distinct advance upon anything that existed before,
and feel assured that every future comparative psychol-
ogy will build upon the foundations here laid down.
If others have expressed themselves less systematically,
they have none the less been guided by the same im-
pulses and have contributed to the same end. SirJohn
Lubbock, in his study. of "Ants, Bees, and Wasps,"
devotes his best energies to ingeniously testing the
powers of their senses, their instincts of orientation,
their modes of communication, their ways of solving
the perplexing problems that an arbritrary change in
their environment produces and so on. The same zeal
in bringing a large number of apparently disparate
facts into serial order dominates Grant Allen's expo-
sition of the growth and development of the Color-
Sense, as well as his treatise upon the origins of the
pleasurable and painful effects of sensation and emo-
tion,— "Physiological Esthetics."
Such studies have an intimate relation with the an-
thropological aspect of psychology, in which depart-
ment English activity has been eminently successful.
Of this the authoritative works of Tylor, upon "Prim-
itive Culture," and "The Early History of Mankind,"
and of Lubbock, upon "Prehistoric Times," are sufli-
cient evidences. Their admirable expositions of the
evolution of arts and customs; the varied career of
the foundations and development of culture ; their
discussion of the beginnings of expression and com-
^
munication, both pictorial and oral ; their analyses of
the more or less unconscious psychological systems
that underlie the peculiar beliefs and thought-habits
of primitive peoples ; and the equally interesting ten-
dencies to a reversion towards such beliefs, that ap-
pear all along the zig-zag line of advance in culture,
—
certainly no more entertaining chapters of mental de-
velopment have been written.
In the remaining department of comparative psy-
chology, "Infant Psychology," the English have
shown a deep interest though they are represented by
few original studies. In the closely allied field of the
application of psychology to education, much appre-
ciation has been felt in Great Britain, and it may suf-
fice to again refer to the works of Bain and Sully.
The products of a mind so original as that of
Francis Galton could not readily be classified in the
psychological activity of any country. His studies of
"Hereditary Genius," tracing by aid of painstaking
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methods the heredity of exceptional mental and phys-
ical gifts ; his similar study of the effects of heredity
and environment, of nature and of nurture, upon the
production of English men of science ; and the more
general exposition of the laws governing the distribu-
tion of faculty in his latest vi^ork, "Natural Inher-
itance," are all deeply permeated with the evolution-
ary doctrines and form a unique chapter of science,
interesting no one more deeply than the student of
scientific psychology. Mr. Galton's studies of the
strengths of the links that hold together the chain of
ideas, of the peculiar associations of sounds with
colors, and the equally strange "number-forms," to-
gether with his invention of composite photography
and many other ingenious devices for measuring and
recording human faculty,—all merit careful attention
and will be found in his "Inquiry into Human Fac-
ulty," and other works.
Although the present sketch makes no attempt to
render a complete account of British psychology, it
would be decidedly lacking were no mention made of
a movement that at the present moment contributes
more than any other to the discussion of psycholog-
ical matters, and is amassing more rapidly than any
other a vast and heterogeneous literature— I mean
the " Psychic Research" movement. The "Society for
Psychical Research " has in the six or seven years of its
existence accumulated a bewildering mass of material,
bearing on one phase or another of the miscellajieous
group of problems that lie partly within and partly
upon the border-lines of science and the mysterious
borderland that some call the supernatural. One must
refer, though not without misgivings, to the volum-
inous numbers of the "Proceedings" of the society and
to the two volumes of the " Phantasms of the Living "
for a more detailed account of the movement and its
results. The main interest has centered in the possi-
bility of the transference of thought from mind to mind
apart from the recognized channels of sensation ; which
possibility the society has accepted as proven and
termed "Telepathy." While acknowledging that the
observations contributing to this result have brought
to light many unsuspected phenomena of genuine psy-
chological value, I cannot refrain from expressing my
conviction that this premature verdict of the society
and especially the application of this theory to the ex-
planation of the still more dubious death-bed presenti-
ments and the like, will have a deterrent influence
upon the progress of psychology in Great Britain. The
work of the society in investigating spiritualistic phe-
nomena and in studying the psychology of- deception
deserves especial credit. The society has made many
and interesting studies of Hypnotism and has added
several instructive experiments to this study. They
have also done well in rescuing from oblivion man\-
facts either of psychological or anthropological value
that without such organized effort are not apt to be
accessible. While the future progress of the society
has the good will of all psychologists, and its "Proceed-
ings" will continue to be eagerly read, one must regret
the tendency of this interest to withdraw attention
from other and more important departments of psy-
chological research.
Turning from Great Britain to our own country, I
find it still more difficult to properly characterize the
status of scientific psychology. While in many respects
we follow English traditions, using their text-books,
and absorbing their literature, we diverge from them
in being more eagerly on the alert for promising lines
of work wherever found, in a readiness to introduce
innovations whenever circumstances will allow, and in
brief in utilizing the freedom, though not without
appreciating the disadvantages, of intellectual and
educational youthfulness. On the one hand the same
interests that have been indicated as representative of
British psychology will be moderately true of America.
Biological science is in a very flourishing condition in
this country, and the interests in the mental side of
life that such study furthers, has been duly cultivated.
We have, too, an " American Societj^ for Psychical Re-
search," studying the same phenomena as the English
society, * that has yet published comparatively little, but
has maintained a cautious attitude, and brought to light
quite a number of phenomena of high psychological
importance. On the other hand we have found a great
inspiration in the experimental psychology of Germany.
While a very fair proportion of Wundt's students at
Leipsic are Americans, I believe no Englishman has
ever studied there. Amongst us the place of leadership
in this field belongs to G. Stanley Hall, formerly Pro-
fessor of psychology at the Johns Hopkins University,
and now President of Clark University. At the former
institution Prof. Hall introduced the psychological
laboratory and conducted a vigorous department of
scientific psychology. Some of the studies from this
laboratory were published in Mind, the English journal
of philosophy and psj'chology, and were continued in the
American Journal of Psychology, '^\^&TL that periodical
was inaugurated by Prof. Hall two years ago. This
journal maintains a high standard of original contribu-
tions, presents a survey of current psychological liter-
ature such as is not to be found elsewhere, and may
perhaps be regarded the most important contribution
to psychology from this side of the Atlantic. There
can be little doubt that with the advantages that Clark
University offers, that institution will soon form the
nucleus of psychological research in this country.
Prof. James, of Harvard College, though with some-
* Since tliese words have been written the Anierican Society has decided
to become a branch of the English Society.
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what different interests, has contributed by personal
inlluence as well as. by a series of brilliant essays to the
furtherance of psychological studies amongst us. More-
over, there are man}' indications that the career of
scientific psychology in the United States is full of
promise. Dr. Cattell, a pupilof Wundtj has organized
a department of experimental psychology in the Uni-
'versitj'of Pennsylvania, and other institutions are look-
ing forward to a similar step. I may be allowed, too,
to mention the chair of ' ' Experimental and Comparative
Ps3chology" at the University of Wisconsin, which I
now occupy and with which is maintained a laboratory
of experimental psycholog}'. While thus we have
simply entered upon the initial stages of our career, our
interests are wide and well grounded, our foundations
are securely laid, and one may be allowed to confi-
dently hope, if not to predict, that amongst the ad-
vances in Psychology that the future holds in store, a
good share will come from American psj'chologists.
THE NATURE OF THOUGHT.
The physiological aspect of thought is the activ-
ity of living brain-substance. We think in that we
are aware of certain states of ourselves ; in short, be-
cause we feel. Thinking, accordingly, is a special
kind of feeling ; it is developed from feeling and may
be called articulatedfeeling.
Feeling is here employed as the general term.
Sensation is one kind, thinking another kind of feeling.
Sensation is the product of two factors : the feeling
subject and the sensed object. Thus every sensation
of a feeling being has a foreign element in it. Think-
ing seems to be free of this foreign element, for think-
ing is a purely internal act. It only seems to be free
from this foreign element, for in truth, it is not free.
It is free in so far only_ as the foreign element in the
meantime has become our own. Thinking is con-
cerned with the memories of sensations, and these mem-
ories' are part of ourselves. Yet they were imported
into the thinkingsubjectby formersensations. Without
former sensations and their memories, that internal
kind of feeling, which we call thinking, is impossible.
Thought is distinguished from feeling by a distinct-
ness that in all other feelings is lacking. The dis-
tinctness of thinking is due to its being a repetition of
a feeling perceived before. The oftener a feeling is
repeated, the greater will be its distinctness. Its form
will appear more and more regular. Thus distinct-
ness is the recognition of regularit)', /. e., of conform-
ity to law. Similarly the articulation of speech and
song are due to the regularity, and the recognition of
regularity, in the production of sound waves.
Upon an introspection into the process of feeling
in general and of articulate feeling in particular, we
state the following facts :
1. Feeling is caused by irritation.
2. Feeling tends to motion.
Feeling is a process that takes place between irrita-
tion and its reaction. Irritations may be either inter-
nal or external. External irritations are impressions
produced by contact with the surrounding world ;. by
the rays of light upon the eye, by waves of sound upon
the ear, etc. Internal irritations are such as hunger
and thirst.
Living substance, being irritable and endowed with
memory, adapts itself to such conditions of contact
with surrounding objects as are often repeated, and
thus a regularity is produced, which by and by leads
to distinctness. Living matter in its lowest forms is
irritable throughout. Very soon, however, irritability
is specialized as feeling in the sensory nerve-cells and
eventually mounts to a clearness which is called con-
sciousness. The highest form of feeling is attained
when it appears in distinctlj' articulated speech ; and
it is this articulated feeling which we call thought.
What is stated for feeling holds good for thought also :
1
.
The process of thinking is directly or indirectly
caused by irritations ; and
2. It ultimately results in motion.
The tendency of thought to pass into motion is called
will. Will, as all tendency to motion, must have a
direction or an aim. The aim of will is c'aW&A. purpose.
The motion produced by will is called action.
Thought need not directly originate from irrita-
tions, it may proceed from the memories of former irri-
tations. Irritations certainly remain its ultimate foun-
dation, and the substance of all thought throughout
exists only because irritations have been previously
received. The most abstract thought, our conception
of form, and with it all purely formal sciences, even
erroneous thought, the shadowy chimeras of the mind,
have all ultimately originated from feeling of some
kind. We arrived there through some process of ab-
straction. In this respect the old dictum of the
schoolmen remains true forever : Nihil est in intel-
lectu quod non antea fuerit in sensu. Nothing is in
our mind which has not been before in our senses.
Certain feelings correspond to certain contacts. They
thus become representatives first of the contacts, then
of the objects themselves which cause the contact.
Thus living creatures acquire a possibility of depict-
ing their surroundings in their own substance. They
can in their feelings map out the world in which they
live. The different feelings become so many images
of the objects to which they correspond. Not only
the things of the outside world, in their effects upon
ourselves, but also the movements of our members in
their actions upon things external are portrayed in the
feeling nerve-substance. Both together furnish all
the data for our knowledge of the world.
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Cognition, accordingly, may be characterized as a
process of orientation in the world. The macrocosm
outside is depicted in the microcosm within, and the
more correctly the latter represents the former, the
nearer it is to truth.
Our next statement derived from these considera-
tions we formulate as follows : Feeling, and more so
3. Tliinking, is a representative process.
The process of orientation is of greatest importance
to living beings, because it facilitates adaptation to
their surroundings. Tiiey can pre-arrange certain adap-
tations in their thoughts ; they can make plans of their
movements before the execution of the movements
takes place.
4. The mechanism of thinking consists in combining,
in separating, and re-combining the representative im-
ages or symbols.
Thinking is an inner experimentation with images
and symbols of things, to the end of deciding, how
an intended action (the reaction against the irritation)
shall -take place. Thus it becomes a great saving in
the economy of animal activity. Instead of trying all
possibilities in reality, until one is found that is best
suited to the occasion, the images of things, obtained
through the feelings of previous experiences, are as-
sociated and disassociated within the brain, until there
results the desired combination, which thereupon is
executed. Then the purpose of thinking is attained
;
it ends in a reflex action against irritations.
Students, as a rule, are confined to their study.
They represent the brain of a community and may be
considered as the specialized organ of thought in man-
kind. It is natural, perhaps, that students and thinkers
should often imagine that thinking exists for its own
sake. Their opinion is repeated by those who may be
called the dilettanti in the art of thought, and thus it
happens to be a fashionable dogma of the time. Never-
theless it is an error.
5. The purpose of thinking is adaptation to surround-
ing conditions.
Thought, you may object, sometimes does not end
in action, but in the suppression of action. Inhibition,
however, is an action also. Thought should always end
in the regulation or adjustment of our behavior toward
our surroundings. If it does not, it is not the right kind
of thought. Thought for its own sake is a disease. If
muscles contract neither for a special purpose nor
for the general purpose of exercise, we call the con-
traction a cramp. Thought for its own sake is a
spasm of the brain.
Abstract thought is a still greater economy than
thinking in concrete images, because it introduces
the principle of economy into thought itself.* Images
* Economy of thought does not mean that we should think less but that
thought should become more effective. By economy we are enabled with the
same amount of thought to accomplish more work.
of single objects are substituted by more comprehen-
sive symbols which find their best expressions in
words, and one word-symbol represents many images.
In this manner the representative process is enhanced.
Words become representations of representations, and
each further advance of human intelligence, as Ernst
Mach has pointed out, will be characterized in some
wa}' as an "Economy of Thought."
Higher thinking, (thinking, ««r' e'lfoj/^r,) as wefind
it in the human brain, is called abstract thought, be-
cause it is conditioned by abstraction. Particular
qualities that are common to several things, are men-
tally severed from the images of these things, and then
combined into a new unity by a special symbol. The
most natural symbols being words (in so far as they
are most easily communicated), language is the means
by which abstract thought becomes possible. Noirtj
said: "Man thinks because he speaks,"?, e., man
thinks "in abstracts," because within his mind notions
of abstract qualities by means of word-symbols have
been combined into unities.
Still, in a different sense the inverse is also true :
" Man speaks because he thinks." In this case think-
ing is employed in its broader sense. Man has learned
to speak because his mind was filled with images, of
which a great many similar ones naturally tended to
combine. In the broader sense of the word all animals
ma)' be said to think ; in the strict sense of the term,
man alone thinks.
THE RISE OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
If thought is called articulated feeling, we may call
consciousness condensed or intensified feeling. Con-
sciousness can only have arisen from feeling through
an inhibition of reflex motion. It is, undoubtedly, the
failure of the purpose of reflex motion to which living
substance owes its higher development. If all reflex
motions that react against irritations, had alwaj's an-
swered their purpose, there never would have been a
need of consciousness and the animal world would lead
an unconscious, purely instinctive life not very much
different from that of plants. Animal life would only
consist in the performance of simple reflex motions.
Let us suppose that the reflex motion of coughing
in a patient were attended with pain, by which the ir-
ritation in the throat would rather be aggravated than
relieved, would not, as a rule, the patient seek to re-
strain the cough, and would he not, by and by, attain
a point where the reflex-ganglion would resist the irri-
tation and suppress the reflex-motion even in sleep ?
Dr. Mcebius,* professor of zoology at the university
of Kiel, relates an interesting e;?periment performed by
Mr. Amtsberg, of Stralsund.
^
f Scltriften dcs Natiir7u!ssc,is!iit//lichen rnciiis -jon Schles-v/g-ffolstein }
quoted from Prof. Max Miiller: "The Science of Tliought." Vol. I, p. 10.
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"A pike, who swallowed all small fishes which were put into
his aquarium, was separated from them by a pane of glass, so that,
whenever he tried to pounce on them, he struck his gills against
the glass, and sometimes so violently that he remained lying on
his back, like dead. He recovered, however, and repeated his on-
slaughts, till they became rarer and rarer, and at last, after three
months, ceased altogether. After having been in solitary con-
finement for six months, the pane of glass was removed from the
aquarium, so that the pike could again roam about freely among
the other fishes. He at once swam towards them, but he never
touched any one of them, but always halted at a respectful dis-
tance of about an inch, and was satisfied to share with the rest the
meat that was thrown into the aquarium. He had therefore been
trained so as not to attack the other fishes which he knew as in-
habitants of the same tank. As soon, however, as a strange fish
was thrown into the aquarium, the pike in nowise respected him,
but swallowed him at once. After he had done this forty times,
all the, time respecting the old companions of his imprisonment, he
had to be removed from the aquarium on account of his large size
" The training of this pike was not, therefore, based on judg-
ment ; it consisted only in the establishment of a certain direction
of will, in consequence of uniformly recurrent sensuous impres-
sions. The merciful treatment of the fishes which were familiar
to him, or, as some would say, which he knew, shows only that
the pike acted without reflfection. Their view provoked in him,
no doubt, the natural desire to swallow them, but it evoked at the
same time the recollection of the pain he had suffered on their ac-
count, and the sad impression that it was impossible to reach the
prey which he so much desired. These impressions acquired a
greater power than his voracious instinct, and repressed it, at least
for a time.' The same sensuous impression, proceeding from the
same fishes, was always in his soul the beginning of the same
series of psychic acts. He could not help repeating this series,
like a machine, but like a machine with a soul, which has this ad-
vantage over mechanical machines, that it can adapt its work to
unforeseen circumstances, while a mechanical machine cannot.
The pane of glass was to the organism of the pike one of these un-
foreseen circumstances."
Deliberation before action and with it all higher
kind of thought becomes possible only through an
inhibition of reflex action. The tendency to act still
continues, even if action itself is inhibited. The desire
to do a certain thing and the memory of pain or dis-
appointment that inhibits it, come into conflict and a
struggle between them results, that will either lead to
the entire suppression of the intended act or it will
bring about an adaptation to circumstances. If the
latter takes place, the tendency to act has gained the
upper hand over inhibition, nevertheless the resultant
is different from what it would have been as a simple
reflex motion without having passed through the pro-
cess of deliberation. It is modified and most likelj'
better suited to the circumstances.
One of the most important tasks of education is that
of accustoming youth to self-discipline. The will.need
not and must not be suppressed or even weakened,
but there must be developed a still stronger power of
control which, if it be necessary, will inhibit impulses
of the will or, at least, prevent them from passing into
action before they have been submitted to a thorough
critical examination. This scrutiny consists in com-
paring all the resultant consequences of the intended
act with the memories of similar cases, be they of one's
own experience or implanted in the mind through in-
formation from other sources.
Men, in whom this process takes place, are not so
easily decoyed into actions, which later on they must
repent. Such a self-control makes it possible, that not
only the desire which at the time excites us will be
decisive, but all the other ideas, the memories and im-
ages that live in our mind, will also have an influence
upon the final decision. If impulses are thus controlled,
we behold, as it were, an orderly meeting, called to
order by a presiding officer, who by turns grants the
word to each and all present, who might have anything
to say concerning the matter under discussion. The
meeting consists of our own ideas, our hopes, our
wishes, our longings, and aspirations, while the presid-
ing officer is represented by our power of self-control.
The mind of a man who is exclusively swayed by the
influence of the moment, who easily yields to the pres-
ent impulse, resembles the gathering of a mob where
the most impetuous talker is always the leader. The
sudden impulses of the will are then executed before
the other side of the question can be heard. Such a
man is limited to the situation of the moment ; he be-
comes a sport of circumstances and a slave to his own
passions. Moral freedom, that higher condition in
which all ideas of our mind enjoy equal rights and
perfect liberty, is possible only by an inhibition of
action through self-control.
The inhibition of a reflex motion does not annihilate
the suppressed irritation ; it makes it even more in-
tense. A suppressed sneeze thus can provoke a very
disagreeable sensation. In certain circles, where eti-
quette banishes- sneezing as a breach of manners, people
have discovered a means of suppressing the irritation
by the aid of a counter-irritation. They press the
bridge of the nose between the eyes, and by this sim-
ple method they free themselves from the tickling ir-
ritation that causes sneezing.
This will do for the suppression of a sneeze, but
it is a different matter when the irritation appears in
the form of hunger, which, if not satisfied, will keep
increasing. It will again and again start a pro-
cess of deliberation and consider every circumstance
that may be turned to advantage. Hence the proverb
says, that hunger sharpens the wit.
If the necessities of life cannot directly be satisfied,
they must be indirectly. If their end is not im-
mediately attainable, means must be invented, which
on a longer, yet on a better and safer, way will after all
accomplish the end. And the means that had to be
inserted between a will and its end or purpose, made
thinking necessary. Deliberation was wanted in order
to introduce the means to the end, and thus it is want
THE OPKN COURT.
that produced in living creatures the development
and further perfectionment of thought.
The strong impulse of self-preservatjon, and the
impossibihty of directly satisfying this craving,com-
pel organized substance to rise from the lower state of
a dim feeling to that of clear consciousness. Want is
an inner irritation that can produce the most terrible
pain and bring man to the verge of despair. Like the
Sphin.x of CEdippus, it cruelly sacrifices innumerable
beings and thus sternly demands the solution of prob-
lems that will and must be solved under penalty of
painful perdition. Thus guides the fear of death to a
higher stage of life. But it guides only the courageous
thinker, the CEdippus who by the power of thought is
the victor in the struggle for existence. The faculty
of thinking, and with it the clearness of conscious
thought, has been forced upon us.
We learn from these facts that the philosophy of
Deism which prevailed among liberals of the eight-
eenth century and is still in vogue to day is an erron-
eous notion of God. The divinity that shapes our
ends, the all- life that manifests itself in nature, is of a
different kind than the deists imagined. The deists
regarded God as an all-loving, benevolent father,
whose purpose was the happiness of his creatures.
God's good intentions, however, were too often frus-
trated through the malevolence and ignorance of men.
In contrast to this view, it must be admitted, that
the old orthodox conception of God is far more correct.
The God of the Bible is free from the philanthropic
sentimentality of the eighteenth century, and agrees
better with positive facts. The God of the Old Testa-
ment is a stern master, who through servitude guides to
freedom, and after visitations dispenses his blessings.
It must strongly be doubted, whether men amidst
mere enjoyments, living in a state of constant happi-
ness, would ever advance. Man received into his
household certain animals, as sheep and oxen, and
took good care of them. Their lot must now appear as
more desirable than that of their previous state of free-
dom ; they are unacquainted with the hard struggle for
existence, and upon their verdant pastures they have
no evil foreboding of their imminent death. And even
death itself, if they are destined for meat, is inflicted
in the least painful manner.
If anywhere among living creatures there has been
realized the ideal picture of undisturbed happiness,
and of a pure enjoyment of life, it certainly is to be
found among the herds on our cattle-farms. Yet, at
what a price ! While the wild sheep and the wild bull
are eminently distinguished from other animals by
their intelligence, domestic sheep and oxen under the
care of man have to such an extent become obtuse,
that their very names have strikingly become the sym-
bols of irredeemable stupidity.
The real God, who rules supreme in the evolution
of cosmic life, is free from all sentimentality. He may
certainly appear cruel in comparison with the ideal
of a fatherly and philanthropic grandsire. He rather
resembles a stern father, who does not, in a weak
good-naturedness spoil his children, but educates them
now with severity, now with kindness, in order to
develop their powers. The history of evolution proves
that he does not intend to bring up faint-hearted, sen-
timental children of happiness ; he wants his sons to be
intellectually and physically self-reliant, reared in the
bracing atmosphere of freedom. p. c.
THE GROUND OF ALL LIBERAL RELIGION.*
BY FRANCIS E. ABBOT.
[reprinted, in part, from the DECEMBER "UNITARIAN REVIEW."]
"The nineteenth century is drawing to its close ; it will soon
pass into history forever. What, for educated men, stands out
conspicuously as the one great, established, and irreversible re-
sult of the nineteenth century in the sphere of religious thought ?
Briefly, this : that Naiun means tJie All of Beins;, and that Ihe only
road to knowledge of Nature is the ScientificATethod. This truth our
children will inherit, for it is the very thought-atmosphere of the
modern man ; the educated think it, and what the educated think
to-day, the uneducated will think to-morrow. In other words, the
old dualism of Nature and God, as two independent or semi-inde-
pendent realities, has died out of the modern mind. Supernatu-
ralism in all its forms is disappearing into the past as an ' outgrown
standpoint ' ; henceforth, for the well-informed and cultivated
mind, the only God is the Immanent God. Struggling against this
irrevocable verdict of the facts is to-day but wasted energy ; who-
ever would win and hold even the attention of disciplined intelli-
gence must concede the absolute unity of Nature as the All, and
the sole sufficiency of the Scientific Method to establish the truth
about Nature. For all who have eyes to see or ears to hear these
results have been put beyond all reasonable doubt by the great
discoveries of the nineteenth century
" Two great opposing parties, intrenched in two great oppos-
ing philosophies, dispute possession of the Scientific Method itself,
as Lucifer and Michael are imagined to have disputed possession
of the body of Moses. Agnosticism declares that the Scientific
Method applies only to phenomena, to the appearances or shows
of things, and has no possible application to notiinena,] or things
as they really exist in their internal relations and constitutions ;
while Scientific Theology declares that the Scientific Method ap-
plies necessarily both to phenomena and to noumena, both to
things as they seem and to things as they are. Agnosticism de-
clares that it is impossible ' to climb through Nature up to Nature's
God,'—that Nature is knowable and known, while God is both un-
known and unknowable ; and this position it takes because, floun-
dering still in the antiquated dualism of the last century, it has
*A paper read before the National Conference of Unitarian and Other
Christian Churches, at Philadelphia, Oct. 30, 18S9.
\ Plii-nomenctn means " appearance" iErscheinung), derived from i^idtvEG-
\int to-appear; Notimenon means "thought or idea" {gcdankending), derived
from mtlv to think. Kant calls the former Sinncswestn, (object of the senses),
the latter, gedaJiken-wescn^ (object of thought). Phenomenon is now fre-
quently used in the sense of " natural process," and noumenon in the sense
of " thing in itself." Prof. Huxley as well as Mr. F. E. Abbot uses the word
noumenon as equivalent to " thing in itself," and it seams as if Mr. Abbot uses
the word "thing in itself," as equivalent to " thing," /. c, " the thing as it
exists independently of thinking subject." We use the word in its originaL
meaning (as " thought ").—Ed.
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no scrap or shred of comprehension of the modern monism which
conceives God as immanent in Nature. But Scientific Theology
declares that it is impossible to know Nature in any degree with-
out knowing God precisely in the same degree,—that both are
knowable, but neither is wholly known, by man,—and that the
progress of natural knowledge is itself the ever-progressive revela-
tion of the Immanent God
"Whenever Agnosticism is not contending for mere victory
in controversy (as was the case in Professor Huxley's recent arti-
cles), it plants itself avowedly on the principle that things in
themselves, or nounicnn, are unknowable, and that phenomena
alone are knowable. Notwithstanding his too adroit and diplo-
matic ignoring of his own fundamental principle in these articles,
Huxley himself frankly avowed it five years ago, when he said :
' Agnosticism simply says that we know nothing of what may be
beyond phenomena.' In that sentence is summed up the whole
meaning, the whole power, the whole danger of the attack. Upon
that principle alone, be it strong or be it weak, rests the Agnostic
contention that the Scientific Method is valid for phenomena, but
invalid for noumena,—in other words, that nothing can be known
by man, whether in the present or in the future, respecting God,
Freedom, or Immortality. Prick that principle, and philosophical
Agnosticism, the only pretense of an intellectual foundation for
popular Agnosticism, is gone like a bubble
"To-day. the great conflict of the ages is concentrated on
this fundamental question : can we, or can we not, know anything
in itself,—that is, not merely as it seems, but as it is ? If we cannot,
science is as false as theology ; if we can, science is itself theology.
If we cannot know things as they are in themselves, we must
either know them as they are not in themselves—which would be
absolute error ; or else we cannot know thern at all which would
be absolute ignorance. To one or the other of these, absolute error
or absolute ignorance, the Agnostic principle reduces all human
knowledge, turning science itself into absolute nescience
"The scientific materials for a scientific world-conception
are all here, if we have intellectual ability to handle them ; if we
cannot handle them, it is no fault of theirs. Agnosticism holds
two in one hand and /wo in the other hand, yet does not compre-
hend that it holds/o«r in both hands ; it does not know enough to
see thewhole in the sum of the parts. Intellectual feebleness,
philosophical incapacity— this, despite the eminent abilities in
other directions which I recognize and admire in so many Agnos-
tics, is the charge which I deliberately and advisedly bring against
Agnosticism itself, as a pretended ' philosophy.' Mere specialists
in science, however able in their specialties, are not philosophers
;
philosophy must be universal, not special, and climb high enough
to see the whole in the sum of the parts. He who cannot do this,
who cannot find in the wealth of universal science enough mate-
rial to frame a world-conception, is too ambitious when he erects
his own individual inability into a universal limit of knowledge,
and presumes to declare the impossibility of knowing that which
science, by the very law of its being, is bound to know. As surely
as human reason is active, irrepressible, and in the long run vic-
torious over all difficulties, so surely will the Scientific Method
•yet generate a truly philosophic world-conception ; and that world-
conception, solidly grounded in science and in philosophy, will be
the future's Idea of God
"The doubt or disbelief of God will soon be followed by
doubt or disbelief of the Moral Law itself. True, ethical relations
must exist wherever moral beings exist. But moral beings could
not be moral beings, if morality were not a universal law above
them,—nay, the all-pervading law of the universe itself
"No ethical enthusiasm which is empty of a scientific idea
can long sustain itself in the wild turmoil of modern thought ; it
must at last go down before any idea. sufficiently virile to ground
itself upon scientific reason Enthusiasts who seek to unite Ethics
with .\gnosticism imagine that the Agnostic principle destroys
Theology alone. What fatal blindness ! The Agnostic principle
destroys Ethics no less certainly than Theology. When Agnostics
begin to demand, as they will demand, some cosmical reason why
Ethics should not be thrown overboard together with Theology,
what faintest glimmer of a reason has Agnosticism to offer ? ' In-
deed,' says Mr. Salter, in his recent most beautiful and noble
book, 'no serious man wants a reason.' So wide of the truth is
this, that no man is serious until he does want a reason ; all serious-
ness begins in wanting reasons. Without a reason. Ethics itself
must die down into mere custom or convention ; the ideas of reason
and of right are Siamese twins. The ' ethical passion,' if it con-
tain not the ethical idea, is the weakest passion of the human
soul—has in itself no more continuance or abiding life than a
beautiful cut flower ; yet, for modern men, there can be no ethical
idea which is not grounded in the known constitution of an ethical
universe. It is pathetic, it is tragic, to behold a sincere and lofty
ethical movement seeking vainly to establish itself upon an .^gnos-
tic foundation. Who cannot foresee the end of such a movement ?
Either it will seek, before it is too late, a new foundation in Sci-
entific Theology,* or else it will die of intellectual and spiritual
thirst in Agnosticism. For it stands written in the nature of things
that, amidst the fury of contending passions, the Moral Ideal itself
shall go to the wall, unless it drink omnipotence from the Divine
Idea."
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES.
We have above reproduced from the e.ssay of Mr. F. E. Abbot
in the Unitarian Riview a number of forcible passages of which
we approve ; but we have omitted the remaining part of the essay,
because we cannot follow Mr. Abbot into the conclusions he draws
from his so-called " Scientific Theology."
Mr. Abbot correctly says : " The reality of a World- Order is
itself the possibility of a World Science"; and we might have ex-
pressed the same idea in the very same words ; indeed, we have
expressed it in almost the same terms. f Further on Mr. Abbot
says, ' ' In the final upshot, what men think of God, must depend on
what they know of Nature, and that knowledge is science." We
agree with this also, for we declare with Mr. Abbot that God is
immanent ; God and the Universe are one.
But Mr. Abbot becomes inconsistent with himself when he calls
God an Infinite and Eternal Person, by whom all things live. The
unity of the universe he declares to be " Omnipresent Se!f-coi.-
scious Energy or absolute Personality." When Mr .\bbot main-
tains, that "morality could not be the all-pervading law of the
Universe itself, if the universe were impersonal or non-moral," we
must most emphatically object. The universe, or if you prefer
God, is neither moral nor immoral. That power in which we live
and move and have our being is simply such as it is. Morality
means to be in harmony with that power, it means obedience 10
the law. Human beings can be moral or immoral, according as
their conduct agrees with, or does not agree with. God. But God
himself cannot be said to be moral. If we want to find out what
He is, we must study nature, we must learn how He works The
Universe is a law unto itself ; and concord with that law law is
morality. There is poetry in the conception of God as a person,
but there is no science in it.
Mr. Abbot says that there are three ultimate types of being :
namely, the Machine, the Organism, and the Person, The Ma-
chine is mechanical causality, the Organism is organic finality, and
the Person is ideal morality. This is, indeed, most beautifully
»We i
Science: v
tSee '
254, •• Upo
expression Scientific Theology, if il is identical
if ii signifies the postulaie of a Divine personality.
-
ntal Problems." under Definitions and Explanation
:r of the World depends itsCognizability."
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expressed ; and Mr, Abbot, standing on the principle of monism,
declares that the three are one.
Certainly the three are one. The person is a perfect organ-
ism and the organism is a perfect machine. But not tIcl- versa ;
not every machine is a perfect organism, nor every organism a per-
fect person. The mechanical principle that regulates the motions
of the celestial bodies, cannot be considered as personal. Nor, be-
cause evolution tends everywhere to .develop higher forms from
lower forms, can the universe as such be supposed to be a moral
being or a person. For this is the great lesson taught by evolution,
that life as it is now, can transcend itself ; it can transform itself,
and iniis/, according to nature's laws, transform itself into a higher
form of life.
Since we know that evolution is a reality, we can dispense
with the anthropomorphic conception of God ; we need no longer
believe in the contradiction of a personal God, for now we know
that God is immanent, that Nature and God are one ; or to express
it in IMr. Abbot's own words : " Real knowledge of Nature is real
knowledge of the immanent God."
Mr. Abbot on several occasions in his book, and again in his
address, speaks of " the consensus of the competent " as a criterion
for truth. We do not believe in the consensus of the competent ;
nor does it agree with Mr. Abbot's position. Kant, for instance,
would reject Mr. Abbot's position ; and Mr. Abbot speaks so highly
of Kant that we are certain he would include him in the list of the
" competent." Indeed, there may be a difference of opinion even
among the highly ' ' competent, " and from this difference of opinion
the progress of science rises. In other words, competency is
relative, not absolute. If those who are really competent agree
upon a subject, that upon which they agree is either a common
prejudice of the times or it is a settled question. But with regard
to the scientific problems of the day, it is a matter of course that
the competent will disagree ; while the incompetent do not count
or at least should not count at all. The incompetent, as a rule,
side with the wrong man, though, taken by himself, this man may
be competent enough. The masses are always conservative as
regards the errors and superstitions of the age. They rather side
with the PtoIomjEan astronomers against a Copernicus, and will
make it out as if the consensus of the competent were complete, be-
cause the one man who opposes all the others with his supposedly
absurd ideas seems to be of no consequence.
X- ' «-
There is another question wherein we cannot agree with Mr.
Abbot, and that is his view of " Universals." All philosophical
interest in the Middle Ages hinged upon the problem whether
Universals are real entities or not. The two parties were the Re-
alists and the Nominalists. The Realists said with Plato, " Uni-
versals are real things, they exist independently of things and
would exist even if things did not." TheNominalists said, " Uni-
versals are not entities, they are not objects (res) but mere names
(ni'iiiiiia). They would not exist if things did not exist, for they
are abstracted from things.
The famous Anselm, bishop of Canterbury, said, Universalin
sunt anle res (Universals are before things) ; accordingly, they are
the real entities, they are reolia. Roscellinus, on the contrary,
said : things are real, and universals are generalizations only, which
we acquire by the mental process of abstraction.
We need not mention that the word " Realism," as it is used
in modern times, is employed to designate a wholly different di-
rection of thought. Indeed, Modern Realism may be considered as
equivalent to mediaeval Nominalism, and the scientific method of
Realism, in the sense the word Realism is used to-day, is the out-
come of nominalistic philosophy. The Mediasval Realists were
victorious in their time, for the church threw the weight of her
authority into the scales of Realism and rejected Nominalism as a
heresy. At the Realistic Council of Soisson the consensus of the
competent stood by Realism ; but History decided for Nominalism.
From the date of that decision the gap between the church and
science deepened more and more ; and it led eventually to a breach
known in history as the Reformation, in which the progressive part
of Christianity separated from Rome.
Nominalism, as Mr. Abbot correctly declares, culminated in
Kant, and at present all liberal thought stands upon the principle
of Nominalism.
While upon the whole rejecting Mr. Abbot's interpretation of
Mediaeval Realism and his criticism of Nominalism, we are greatly
indebted to him for having called attention to the fact that the
Universe does not consist of matter alone. The relations among
things, the forms of things are realities also. They are not mate-
rialities, not things, but they are real nevertheless. They are most
important realities and all higher life, all intellectual existence,
and all ethical aspiration depend upon them. Tlie -onrld of forms
iiuleed is iJeiilical loith spirititality.
This is the truth in Mr. Abbot's position, and it is this
which is so little understood by those philosophers who imagine
that the world can be explained from matter and motion alone. It
is this truth which The Open Court inculcates in all its publica-
tions.
The human soul is form ; it is a special form of life. The hu-
man soul is mortal : for every form can be broken. But the human
soul can be made immortal ; for every form can be built again.
Thus Christ spoke plainly about himself ; "Destroy this temple
and in three days I will raise it up," John. ii. ig.
Every philosopher who is not clear about the nature of form,
will be unable to account for the problems of evolution. He will
end in mysticism ; /. e., the belief in some occult principle. He
will end in agnosticism, /. e., in the statement that the problem is
insolvable, it is beyond our ken, it is unknowable.
* ' 7t
A few words concerning Kant's position on this question will
perhaps greatly contribute to clear the situation—or at least char-
acterize our own standpoint.
Mr. Abbot* calls attention to the stupendous proposition of
the great sage of Konigsberg : " Things conform to cognition, not
cognition to things." And Mr. Abbot adds that, this is tanta-
mount to the assertion that things-in-themselves are utterly un-
known."
In his " Prolegomena"
^ 36, Kant argues that the highest laws
of nature (we call them " formal laws") are the very same as the
highest laws of reasoning (we call them "the laws of formal
thought"). The word " highest " is here identical with "most
general." Kant continues : Either we have derived them from
nature by experience, or, vice versa, nature has derived them from
our cognition ; they are the condition of the possibility of cogni-
tion. The former, he says, is impossible, because the highest laws
of reasoning are apriori, they are independent of experience.
Therefore, he concludes, they are not derived from nature by
experience, they do not belong to the objective world, but they
are part of the thinking subject. The thinking subject is so con-
stituted that it cannot help but consider reality clothed in the forms
of cognition. Cognition transfers its own forms upon the things.
Therefore things conform to cognition, not cognition to things.
We do not accept Kant's standpoint. We say :
The thinking subject is a part of the objective world. The
same laws hold good for both. It is all but impossible that the
formal laws of the one should be different from the formal laws of
the other. Thus the extension of our body is tridimensiona', and
"Scientific Theism," Introduction, p. 3.
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there is not the slightest reason why it should be an exception to
the outside world. We do not hesitate to declare that reality in
general is tridimensional also.
The highest laws of nature are the laws of form and the
highest laws of reasoning are the laws of the form of reasoning.
Accordingly both are identical.
Therefore ;
Things conform to the laws of form.
The formal laws of the objective world of nature are not dif-
ferent from the formal laws of the subjective part of the world, of
the thoughts of the subject.
The laws of form are the condition of the world-order and the
laws of formal thought are the instrument of cognition.
I here take occasion to call the reader's attention to Kant's
" Prolegomena," especially to g 3C, headed " Jf'/V /.;/ .Va/iir st'lbsl
mbgUchf
I do not hesitale to consider this chapter as the most important
one in Kant's works. He has written many glorious passages which
contain truth, and nothing but truth. This chapter, however, con-
tains " the key to the main error of his " Critique of Pure Reason ";
and I make bold to say : no one understands Kant who is not
familiar with the motive that led him to adopt the strange doctrine
of the ideality of time and space, and pronounce that bold sen-
tence : "Things conform to cognition, not cognition to things."
Said Schiller
:
' Let but an error be hid in the stone of foundation. The builder
Buildeth with confidence on. Never the error is found."
I admire the strength of a man who has the courage to accept
the logical conclusion, even of a small mistake which he considers
as a truth. If Kant had seen his mistake, he would have inquired
into the origin of the apriori (which he did not do), he would have
found it to be the laws of form, and he would undoubtedly
have come to the same conclusions that are laid down in the
chapter "Form and Formal Thought "in "Fundamental Prob-
lems."
When I read Kant's " Critique of Pure Reason," everything
was so bewildering to me, so labyrinthine, so incomprehensible.
When I read his " Prolegomena," everything became clear, for
then I began to understand Kant's chief fallacy and was thus en-
abled to pick out the forcible lessons which the great German phi-
losopher teaches us.
Mr. Abbot is one of the strongest and one of the most scholarly
American thinkers. How much importance he attaches to the points
in which we disagree from his views, we do not know. But I am
inclined to consider them as difference of expression rather than as
actual contrarieties. For on the one hand Mr. Abbot employs
theological terms in a wider and in a philosophical sense, and we
are justified to interpret them accordingly. On the other hand we
feel the monistic, the positive spirit in every line of his powerful
address. p. c.
THE IDEAL NE'WSPAPER.
In the latest A'orlh Aiiteyican Reine-i>, Mr. Henry E. Rood ad-
vances a suggestion regarding the foundation of an ideal Daily
Newspaper. He appeals to the rich of the United States who are
" possessed of noble ideas and generous spirits, who are anxiously
searching for a way to benefit mankind through a proper dispo-
sition of their property," and suggests "apian for founding an
institution which would be more far-reaching than any college,
which would accomplish untold good, which would make evil-
doers of whatever station tremble, which would aid struggling
humanity to better its condition : an institution more powerful than
pulpit, stage, or forum,— an abso'utely truthful, unprejudiced, in-
dependent, daily paper, whose news columns shall tell the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and whose editorials
shall discuss both sides of every important question."
Mr. Rood continues ;
" The vast power of American journalism cannot bs denied,
even fettered as it is on all sides. It accomplishes much good, but
it also is responsible for much evil. Prejudiced, fearful, and often
corrupt as is the press of to day, it still remains the most influen-
tial factor in American civilization. In this respect all else sinks
into insignificance beside it
; and yet its bulwarks have been raised
at an awful expense to good morals and good government.
'
'
Who is foolish enough to play the races on newspaper ' tips ' ?
Why does one journal suppress all but bare mention of a certain
railroad accident, while another publishes a column account of the
same ? Why do papers cater respectively to the Irish, the Ger-
man, the Italian vote ? Why does one fight Catholicism, and a
second war upon Protestants ? Why do newspapers support party
candidates, whether the latter are known to be honest men or the
veriest scoundrels in the ward ?
"Every day an irresponsible reporter or correspondent hurls
misery, shame, disgrace, upon some family for the sole purpose of
lengthening his space bill. Within a month two suicides have been
recorded whose causes are ascribed to the publication of certain
articles. The men who took their own lives may not have been
mentally sound
; but is that any reason why homes should be in-
vaded by unscrupulous ghouls of the press ?
"The journal of to-day is edited from the counting-room.
The ideal newspaper has not yet made its appearance. The ed-
itorial and the business departments should be absolutely indepen-
dent of each other. The paper should speak the truth, no matter
how its advertising patronage or its political ' pull ' is affected.
" A free andunsubsidized press—where will you find it? Papers
all over the land will rise up, and each, patting itself, cry ' Here ! '
But those in command know that the daily paper which prints the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, the daily paper
whose editorial opinions are absolutely fearless and unprejudiced,
does not exist in the United States.
" The ideal paper should print in its news columns nothing
but that which has been verified. Readers might not get particu-
lars of a race war so soon as in one of the present " enterprising "
journals ; but when published in the ideal paper the news could be
absolutely relied upon. The editorials should discuss in parallel
columns both sides of leading questions. For e.xample, articles
advocating free trade and protection should appear simultaneously.
In the case of a great strike, one column should contain the em-
ployer's views, another the laborer's arguments. Chicago should
have the chance of putting forth her reasons for wanting the
World's Fair as well as New York. The Southern and the North-
ern sides of the race problem should both be discussed. The paper
should argue for and against every great question, local, national,
international. Then could the people read, reflect, and decide
who and what is the right.
"Would such an impartial journal pay ? P<:rhaps not in
money at first. But the people of the United States are willing to
be convinced ; they want the best government, the best officials,
the best of everything. That paper in time would be read from
Maine to California, and beyond the seas. Its influence would be
inestimable, its power transcendent. Evil-doers of whatever party
and station, rich or poor, black or white, alien or native, would
fear it Good citizens would eagerly support it. The poor would
pray for its success.
" The ideal paper should not be pledged to support any party,
community, state, or government. It should be nothing less than
the exponent of humanity. And it must occupy this grand plane
if not an advertisement is received, if not a single copy is sold.
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How can this be accomplished ? Here lies the millionaire's chance
to see his name grouped with those who have made nations, who
have conferred lasting benefits upon mankind.
"Endow such a paper as colleges are endowed. Let it be
managed by a board of trustees. Let the employees represent the
faculty ; the readers, the students. Pay salaries large enough to
command the best editors, writers, and publishers. Have the
trustees select for these various positions men of integrity, of broad
minds, of education, ability, culture, and noble ideas. Be liberal,
so that they put forth continually their best efforts. Guarantee to
the paper a regular income, that it may be published day after day
and decade after decade, if the advertising columns are blank, if
every copy has to be given away.
" The time is ripe, the people are anxious, the field is unoccu-
pied. A great daily paper which could be relied upon absolutely
would be a monument forever to its founders.
" Where is the man or the group of men who will improve this
opportunity ?,"
We have nothing to add to the plan suggested by Mr. Rood
and express our full sympathy with it. Yet we must state that in
our judgment Mr. Rood should not appeal to the vanity of the
rich, but to their love of truth only. It is true that there is a
chance for a man or a group of men, who would engage in a cause
like this, "to make for themselves name and fame unaying."
But this should be a secondary consideration, if any consideration
at all, with the men who are willing to make a sacrifice to truth
and to the best policy, which is and will forever remain Hon-
esty. I am told (I do not know whether it is true) that in one
of our great cities a newspaper was founded with the outspoken
^policy not to pander to, but to educate, the public. The founders
hoped that if they offered a daily journal, the pages of which were
clean, and free from slander, and honest in politics, their enterprise
would be appreciated and aided by general sympathy. After
having sustained great losses, counting many tens of thousand, they
were obliged to give up part of their principles, and the journal, I
am told, is now perhaps somewhat, but not much, different from
its contemporaries.
If we really had a great daily which were clean in every re-
spect and at the same time ably conducted, it would have to edu-
cate the public before it could expect to be a success. The public
at present rather sustains those journals which cater to their lowest
tastes. This we say not in pessimism but as a statement of fact,
and it would be unjust not to add that a tendency for better is per-
ceptible almost everywhere. P. c.
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CELIBACY CONTROVERSY.
BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.
XANTIPPE.
I'd like to know if Socrates,
Before he fell upon his knees
To fair Xantippe, really knew
That she was such a horrid shrew,
Or if she forced herself to please.
Some say he left a life of ease
To school himself by her disease
To bear the worst the world could do
;
I'd like to know.
For if he married her as these
Pretend, aware how she could tease,
Ought we not call him boldest too
As well as wisest ? What say you ?
Ilidn't he rival Hercules,
I'd like to know ?
KHADEEJA.
Mahomet loved Khadeeja well
From marriage feast to burial.
Though he was young and she was old
And he was anything but cold,
From what the true believers tell.
He made the Koran let him dwell
With many wives when death befell
This first. What charm then could she hold
Mahomet loved ?
'Twas this,—she felt the Prophet's spell
When all the world was infidel ;
She bade his failing heart be bold ;
She watched while angel words were told.
And Islam lauds the sentinel
Mahomet loved.
BOOK NOTICES.
The editor of the "Agnostic Annual " for i8go has gotten
together some very interesting reading-matter in the fifty-three
pages that the pamphlet comprises. This is the seventh year of
the publication of the "Annual," whose single purpose is the
firmer establishment and wider dissemination of Agnostic princi-
ples. Mr. Samuel Laing contributes the opening article, entitled
"Agnosticism and Immortality," and we may also note a grace-
fully written poem by Mr. W. B. McTaggart. (Charles A. Wa'ts,
editor; Stewart & Co., 41 Farringdon Street, E. C. London, pub-
lisher.)
Lipphicott's table-of-contents for January is highly attractive.
Julian Hawthorne opens with " Millicent and Rosalind"; Mr.
Edward Fuller writes a few pages apropos of " The Theatrical
Renaissance of Shakespeare," in which our own opinions are fully
voiced; while the editorial pages,—not uncommon with Lippiii-
io/l's,—are very bright.
Messrs. Longmans, Green, & Co., of London, issued early
this year a cheaper edition of Crozier's work on "Civilization
and Progress." The questions of which the author of this book
so intelligently treats, are of far-reaching fundamental importance,
and we shall have occasion, later on, to review the work at lengih.
The Aiiierikanisdier Turner-KalenJcr for the coming year con-
tains its usual wealth of information, and interesting discussion of
engrossing topics. The selections of epigrammatic sayings and the
extracts from current German-American literature are well made.
(The F'reidenker Pub. Co., Milwaukee, Wis.).
We acknowledge the receipt from Mr. H. L Hastings, editor
of the Anti-Infidel Library (10 Paternoster Row, London, E. C.)
of several pamphlets "designed to convince sceptics, instruct in-
quirers, and assist believers to ' put to flight the armies of the
aliens.'
"
From a note in the London Freethinker we learn, that the
"Biographical Dictionaty of Freethinkers," by Mr. Wheeler, is
completed, and that the work will be put on sale within a fort-
night.
NOTES.
With the purpose in view of extending the influence of the
work of The Open Court, and our list of subscribers, we shall be
pleased to offer our periodical, free of charge, for the term of six
weeks, to any parson who shall wish to take advantage of this,
opportunity to become better acquainted with the aim and nature
of our efforts. Address The Open Court Pub. Co.
